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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The National Association for Public Defense 
(NAPD) is an association of more than 14,000 public 
defenders and other professionals who have sought to 
ensure that indigent clients secure their constitu-
tional right to effective assistance of counsel.*  NAPD 
members are advocates in jails, courtrooms, and com-
munities, as well as experts in best practices and the 
practical, day-to-day representation of criminal de-
fendants.  Their collective expertise represents state, 
county, and local systems through full-time, contract, 
and assigned-counsel delivery mechanisms, dedicated 
juvenile, capital, and appellate offices, and a diversity 
of traditional and holistic practice models.  The NAPD 
has a deep interest in the correct interpretation of 
laws and constitutional provisions affecting the rights 
of criminal defendants—particularly defendants who 
cannot afford to hire private counsel. 
As a national organization, the NAPD is commit-
ted to ensuring that the Fourth Amendment is inter-
preted correctly and consistently throughout the 
United States.  It agrees with petitioner that courts in 
state and federal jurisdictions across the country, like 
the Third Circuit in this case, have erred in denying 
individuals their constitutional right to a reasonable 
                                            
* Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amicus cu-
riae states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole 
or in part, and no party or counsel for a party, or any person other 
than amicus curiae or its counsel, made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.  Pur-
suant to Rule 37.2, counsel for amicus curiae states that counsel 
for petitioner and respondent received timely notice of intent to 
file this brief.  All parties have consented in writing to the filing 
of this brief. 
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expectation of privacy merely because they are not 
listed as authorized drivers on rental-car agreements.  
Pet. 15–18, 27–34.  This approach both defies widely 
shared social expectations and misconstrues state 
law.  It also disproportionately affects Americans who 
lack the resources to own property in their own 
names.  Certiorari should be granted. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
More than two centuries after it was ratified, the 
Fourth Amendment continues to protect the “right of 
the people to be secure” from “unreasonable searches.”  
U.S. Const. amend. IV.   Modern technological ad-
vances and social developments do not render our 
rights “any less worthy of the protection for which the 
Founders fought.”  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 
2494–95 (2014).  This Court plays an essential role in 
ensuring that the Fourth Amendment retains its vi-
tality as an indispensable safeguard of liberty, even as 
Americans dramatically change the ways they organ-
ize their everyday affairs. 
This case calls for the Court to play that role once 
again.  The lower courts have sharply diverged over 
whether a driver of a rental car whose name is not 
listed on the rental agreement can have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the car—a frequently recur-
ring issue, because police commonly treat a driver’s 
use of a rental car as a basis for reasonable suspicion 
to justify a traffic stop.  See, e.g., State v. Adan, 886 
N.W.2d 841, 847 (N.D. 2016).  As a result of this split, 
the location where a person is driving at the time of a 
traffic stop could determine whether he has a Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy in a rental car.  This 
Court has provided little guidance to date on the scope 
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of the Fourth Amendment rights of those who use 
property that someone else has rented.  This case of-
fers an opportunity to clear away the confusion about 
the Fourth Amendment’s scope in a society that uses 
rental cars with increasing frequency. 
I. The rising reliance of Americans (especially the 
economically disadvantaged) on car rentals supports 
this Court’s review.  The ascendance of the “sharing 
economy” has highlighted that more people than ever 
rent rather than own the key instrumentalities of life, 
whether out of personal preference or financial neces-
sity.  This case presents an opportunity to provide 
needed guidance to the deeply divided lower courts on 
the Fourth Amendment rights of non-owners—partic-
ularly rental-car drivers whose names have not been 
added to rental contracts.  As the petition ably ex-
plains, this issue recurs with great frequency, and it 
has sharply divided state and federal courts nation-
wide.  Pet. 19–24.  The Court should not allow the 
Fourth Amendment rights of rental-car drivers to de-
pend on jurisdictional happenstance, especially in 
light of the inherent mobility of motor vehicles.  See, 
e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996). 
II. The rule applied by the court of appeals below 
is wrong and systematically underprotects the privacy 
rights of rental-car drivers.  To assert an expectation 
of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable,’” it is not necessary to have a formal prop-
erty interest in the area searched.  Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); see Pet. 32–34.  Even if such an interest were 
required, it is far from obvious that the Third Circuit 
applied such a requirement correctly.  In many juris-
dictions, an unlisted rental-car driver who has the 
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renter’s permission has a property or possessory in-
terest in the car, along with the rights and duties ac-
companying that interest.  And many courts routinely 
decline to enforce the prohibitions on unlisted drivers 
contained in many rental-car contracts.  The court of 
appeals’ rule is therefore unsound regardless of how 
one tests the reasonableness of a driver’s expectation 
of privacy. 
ARGUMENT 
This case poses the question whether a rental-car 
driver who has the renter’s, but not the owner’s, per-
mission to use the car can have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the vehicle.  Pet. i.  This question is 
plainly suitable for certiorari under this Court’s tradi-
tional standards, as the petition explains, because it 
is the subject of an entrenched disagreement among 
several federal courts of appeals and state courts of 
last resort.  See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a).  But it also demands 
resolution in light of the increasing prevalence of car 
rentals in the United States, as well as their particu-
lar importance in poorer communities. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF OUR NATION’S RENTAL 
ECONOMY SUPPORTS CERTIORARI.  
Car and other property rentals play an increas-
ingly important role in our economic and social life.  
Although rentals are nothing new, in recent years 
Americans have been renting cars, housing, and other 
property at increasing rates and under arrangements 
that were not even possible just 10 or 20 years ago.  
Economically disadvantaged individuals in particular 
frequently use rentals and similar arrangements to 
mitigate or escape the cycle of poverty.  Merits aside, 
this case calls for review to clarify the privacy rights 
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of the many millions of Americans who now rely on 
rented cars and other property—even if they are not 
formally listed as drivers or other users in the rele-
vant rental agreements. 
A. Car Rentals Play a Critical and  
Increasingly Prominent Role in  
American Life. 
We are a car-dependent society.  In sharp contrast 
to our pre-automobile ancestors, who would rarely 
venture more than a handful of miles beyond their 
homes, today more than 86 percent of U.S. workers 
commute by car.  U.S. Census Bureau, Who Drives to 
Work? Commuting by Automobile in the United States: 
2013, at 2 (2015), https://goo.gl/ND5QSy. 
Just as automobiles changed the way commuters 
and others get where they need to go, technological 
and cultural developments have changed the way peo-
ple access automobiles.  In large part due to the rise 
of the modern “sharing economy,” Americans increas-
ingly “rent their cars, instead of buying them.”  Matt 
Phillips, Why More and More Americans Are Renting 
Cars Instead of Buying Them, Quartz (June 2, 2014), 
https://goo.gl/sDUWVP.  This trend is emblematic of a 
broader social shift.  “Instead of buying and owning 
things, consumers want access to goods and prefer to 
pay for the experience of temporarily accessing them. 
Ownership is no longer the ultimate expression of con-
sumer desire.”  Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, 
Access-Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing, 
39 J. Consumer Res. 881, 881 (2012) (citation omit-
ted).  “Collaborative Consumption is not a niche trend, 
and it’s not a reactionary blip to the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis.  It’s a growing movement with millions of 
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people participating from all corners of the world.”  
Rachel Botsman & Roo Rogers, What’s Mine Is Yours: 
The Rise of Collaborative Consumption xvi (2010). 
For example, “car sharing” allows consumers to 
“temporarily gain access to cars,” often using a mobile-
phone or online application, “in return for a member-
ship fee.”  Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra, at 881.  Over the 
past decade or so, car sharing has led to a dramatic 
increase in the number of Americans using cars that 
they do not own.  See id. at 886 (“car sharing is a pop-
ular alternative to car ownership and has grown sys-
tematically in the United States, where the revenue 
from car-sharing programs is expected to be $3.3 bil-
lion in 2016, up from $253 million in 2009”). 
This trend has magnified economically disadvan-
taged communities’ preexisting reliance on rental 
cars.  Despite the importance of automobiles to life 
and livelihood, many Americans simply cannot afford 
to purchase a car.  Twenty-four percent of households 
in poverty do not own a vehicle, and low-income pop-
ulations are twice as likely to travel in multi-occupant 
vehicles, through car sharing and carpooling.  Na-
tional Household Travel Survey, Mobility Challenges 
for Households in Poverty 2 (2014), https://goo.gl/ 
U7PBwn.  Frequently, members of low-income house-
holds rent cars or “borrow[] them from neighbors, 
friends, or relatives.”  John Pucher & John L. Renne, 
Socioeconomics of Urban Travel: Evidence from the 
2001 NHTS, 57 Transport. Q. 49, 57 (2003).  Indeed, 
empirical data show that minorities tend to rent cars 
at higher rates.  Kevin Neels, Effects of Discrimina-
tory Excise Taxes on Car Rentals: Unintentional Im-
pacts on Minorities, Low Income Households, and 
Auto Purchases 4–5 & tbl. 2 (2010). 
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These patterns are a critical part of the sharing 
economy, which consists largely of social networks 
that low-income individuals use to survive and even-
tually break the cycle of poverty.  See, e.g., Silvia 
Dominguez & Celeste Watkins, Creating Networks for 
Survival and Mobility: Social Capital Among African-
American and Latin-American Low-Income Mothers, 
50 Soc. Probs. 111 (2003).  By pooling resources and 
support, individuals can leverage their networks to in-
crease socioeconomic mobility.  Id. at 124.  “Low-in-
come communities frequently pool resources in order 
to maximize them. Anchored in strong social networks 
and the collective mindset of low-income individuals, 
this practice is at the core of collective assets and cas-
ual lending with relaxed reciprocity.”  Edna R. 
Sawady & Jennifer Tescher, Financial Decision Mak-
ing Processes of Low-Income Individuals 9 (2008), 
https://goo.gl/d6jJOq. 
The rise of the sharing economy, together with the 
existing importance of rental cars to poorer Ameri-
cans, has resulted in the proliferation of shared rental 
cars among low-income and minority households.  
Thus, among the Americans who increasingly rely on 
rental cars today are many members of our society’s 
most disadvantaged groups. 
Whether they realize it or not, people who sign 
agreements with traditional rental-car companies or 
who click “accept” on their mobile phone when pre-
sented with the terms of modern car-sharing services 
have bought into restrictions on who may drive the 
car.  See, e.g., Zipcar, Rules of Vehicle Use § 1 (Jan. 1, 
2017), https://goo.gl/ftvGXC (“Non-Members are ex-
pressly prohibited from driving a Zipcar vehicle at any 
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time.”).  But “[f]ew people actually read” these provi-
sions.  Irma S. Russell, Got Wheels?: Article 2A, Stand-
ardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and 
Unilateral Private Ordering, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 135, 
136 (2006).  As detailed below, contractual restrictions 
about who may operate rental cars have resulted in a 
conflict among the lower courts on the proper applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. 
B. The Court Should Clarify the Fourth 
Amendment Rights of Users of Rented 
Vehicles. 
The dramatic social trend toward the use of rentals 
and the increased reliance on the sharing economy 
make it especially important that the Court clarify the 
Fourth Amendment rights of non-owners.  The Court 
should grant certiorari to resolve a deep lower-court 
split over whether a rental-car driver may challenge 
an unlawful vehicle search when it turns out that the 
renter did not add the driver’s name to the rental 
agreement.  See Pet. 11–19. 
The Court plays a critical role in clarifying how the 
Fourth Amendment applies to new technologies, hav-
ing repeatedly enforced the Fourth Amendment in 
light of new technological developments.  See, e.g., 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding 
that the use of  “sense-enhancing technology” to view 
the interior of a home invades a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 
(2010) (holding that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in text messages sent through a city 
department–issued pager); United States v. Jones, 
565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that attaching a GPS 
tracker to the bottom of a car constitutes a search); 
9 
 
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding 
that police must have a warrant before accessing cell 
phone data). 
The Court has also ensured that its Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence keeps pace with new social 
developments.  See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 
1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (holding that a mid-
dle school’s strip search of a student suspected of pos-
sessing contraband violated the Fourth Amendment); 
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that hel-
icopter surveillance 400 feet above a defendant’s 
greenhouse did not constitute a search in part because 
the aircraft’s flight was in compliance with FAA regu-
lations).  The Court has accordingly stressed the im-
portance of “the everyday expectations of privacy that 
we all share,” Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 
(1990), and focused on what “society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable,’” Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
Despite the rise of the rental economy, the Court 
has provided little guidance on the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of non-owners.  To be sure, the reasoning 
in the Court’s most relevant cases helps demonstrate 
that the Third Circuit’s decision here is wrong.  In 
cases involving the Fourth Amendment rights of over-
night houseguests and hotel guests, for example, the 
Court has established that a person can have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a place even in the 
absence of any formal ownership interest.  See, e.g., 
Olson, 495 U.S. at 100 (holding that an overnight 
guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy without 
needing absolute control over the home); Stoner v. 
California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (holding that a 
10 
 
warrantless search of a defendant’s hotel room with-
out consent was unlawful even if the hotel clerk con-
sented).  These cases only go so far, however, in clari-
fying whether an unlisted rental-car driver has a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. 
As a result of the extensive lower-court split on the 
question presented, Pet. 11–19, a motorist’s Fourth 
Amendment rights can vary depending on which 
State she happens to be driving in.  For example, a 
resident of Colorado City, Arizona can borrow a 
friend’s rental car without sacrificing her expectation 
of privacy, but only if she takes care to avoid driving 
over the line that splits her town between Arizona and 
Utah.  In some jurisdictions, the applicable rule even 
depends on whether the driver is charged by federal 
or state prosecutors in the event wrongdoing is uncov-
ered.  Pet. 20–21.  “[P]olice enforcement practices” 
may “vary from place to place and from time to time,” 
but this Court has refused to “accept that the search 
and seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment are 
so variable and can be made to turn upon such trivi-
alities.”  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 
(1996); accord Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171–
72 (2008).  Particularly when a case involves automo-
biles, which can and do move from place to place with 
ease, national uniformity in the interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment is critical to ensuring fair treat-
ment and upholding the rule of law. 
This lack of clarity is especially problematic be-
cause, as discussed above, rental cars are critically im-
portant to underprivileged communities.  As Justice 
Sotomayor explained last Term, a more restrictive 
view of the Fourth Amendment’s protections has a dis-
proportionately harmful effect on minorities and other 
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disadvantaged groups.  Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056, 2068–71 (2016) (dissenting opinion); see also, 
e.g., Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their Yards? Cur-
tilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 39 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 297, 317 (2011) (“Residents of poor neigh-
borhoods are more frequently subject to searches of 
their person in the form of overly aggressive stop and 
frisk tactics.”).  Car rentals’ increasing popularity and 
prominent place in economically disadvantaged com-
munities give this case added urgency, amplifying its 
suitability for certiorari under this Court’s traditional 
standards.   
* * * 
This case would be an ideal candidate for review in 
any context:  It squarely presents an important, recur-
ring question of constitutional law that has divided 
the lower courts.  Certiorari is particularly appropri-
ate, however, in light of the important function rental 
cars serve in today’s society. 
II. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S DECISION MISAPPLIES THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND MISCONSTRUES  
PROPERTY LAW.  
This case is also an ideal vehicle because the Third 
Circuit’s approach exemplifies how numerous lower 
courts have erroneously denied unlisted rental-car 
drivers the opportunity to assert their Fourth Amend-
ment rights.  First, the court of appeals’ approach con-
travenes this Court’s Fourth Amendment case law by 
erroneously making a boilerplate rental-car contract 
almost entirely dispositive of whether a driver has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle.  Sec-
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ond, even if this inquiry could be distilled to an anal-
ysis of the driver’s formal legal rights in the vehicle, 
the Third Circuit’s reasoning rests on a mistaken view 
of the common law of property.  Third, courts com-
monly decline to enforce rental-agreement re-
strictions on unlisted drivers, revealing the illogic of 
conditioning constitutional rights on contractual pro-
visions that often have no effect. 
A. The Third Circuit’s Rule Runs Afoul of 
Core Fourth Amendment Principles.  
This Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence es-
chews bright-line rules to determine whether a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly 
rules that depend on the arcana of state law.  But one 
would never know it from reading the Third Circuit’s 
opinions on the privacy rights of unlisted rental-car 
drivers. 
In United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 
2011)—the case that governed the outcome here—the 
Third Circuit held that a driver not listed on a rental 
agreement almost always lacks a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the rental car.  The court held that 
“as a general rule,” an unlisted driver “lacks a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the car unless there ex-
ist extraordinary circumstances suggesting an expec-
tation of privacy.”  Id. at 165.  It reasoned that “the 
lack of a cognizable property interest in the rental ve-
hicle and the accompanying right to exclude make[] it 
generally unreasonable for an unauthorized driver to 
expect privacy in the vehicle.”  Id. at 167.  Indeed, the 
Third Circuit has never found the “extraordinary cir-
cumstances” proviso applicable.  In this case and oth-
ers, it has instead treated Kennedy’s holding as akin 
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to a per se rule, applying it with scant analysis of the 
factual circumstances.  See, e.g., Pet. App. 13a–14a; 
United States v. Mebrtatu, 543 F. App’x 137, 139 (3d 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Norman, 465 F. App’x 110, 
116 n.9 (3d Cir. 2012).  The only circumstances it has 
recognized as an exception are “truly unique” and ex-
tremely narrow—such as when the unlisted driver is 
married to the renter, “personally contacted the rental 
car company” to make the reservation, and “reserved 
the vehicle in his name, using his own credit card.”  
Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165, 168 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (discussing United States v. Smith, 
263 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
This is not how the Fourth Amendment is sup-
posed to work.  “[F]or the most part per se rules are 
inappropriate in the Fourth Amendment context.”  
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002); see 
also, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 
(1984) (“No single factor determines whether an indi-
vidual legitimately may claim under the Fourth 
Amendment that a place should be free of government 
intrusion not authorized by warrant.”).  Although 
courts are inclined to provide clear guidance, they 
must be careful in this area not to devise rigid rules 
that disregard meaningful differences among cases.  
See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968) 
(“The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is 
preeminently the sort of question which can only be 
decided in the concrete factual context of the individ-
ual case.”); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 
282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (“There is no formula for the 
determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be 
decided on its own facts and circumstances.”). 
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Furthermore, a person’s “capacity to claim the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment” does not depend on 
his ability to assert a formal “property right in the in-
vaded place.”  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 
(1978).  Instead, “[l]egitimation of expectations of pri-
vacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth 
Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.”  Id. at 143 n.12 
(emphases added); see also, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[E]ven in the absence of 
a trespass, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when 
the government violates a subjective expectation of 
privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).  The Court has there-
fore recognized that people can have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in areas they have no legal right 
to control.  See, e.g., Olson, 495 U.S. at 100 (overnight 
guest). 
The approach of the Third Circuit (and the other 
courts aligned with it) is inconsistent with these prin-
ciples.  For one, this approach glosses over consequen-
tial differences among cases by dismissing the privacy 
expectations of almost any rental-car driver who lacks 
the rental company’s permission.  The Third Circuit’s 
rule treats people who use rental cars with the 
renters’ permission—an exceedingly common practice 
in society—the same way it treats those who use 
rental cars with no permission at all.  See Pet. 33–34 
(noting that petitioner’s operation of the rental car 
was not wrongful in any criminal sense); see also, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Campbell, 59 N.E.3d 394, 402 
(Mass. 2016) (“A renter’s decision to allow a person 
who is not a permitted driver according to the rental 
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agreement to drive a rental vehicle may be a breach of 
that agreement, but it does not also result in a viola-
tion of criminal law.”).  In fact, the Third Circuit has 
relied on Kennedy in holding that “the possessor of a 
stolen vehicle lacks standing to challenge a search of 
the vehicle.”  United States v. White, 504 F. App’x 168, 
171–72 (2012). 
The Third Circuit also ignores how society views 
innocuous usage of rental cars by unlisted drivers.  
Numerous courts have recognized how common it is 
for individuals not listed on rental agreements to 
drive rental cars.  See, e.g., Mahaffey v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 129, 132 (La. Ct. App. 
1996) (“[W]hen there is a general, broad admonition 
not to let anyone else drive the car” or even an “ex-
press prohibition against third drivers,” it is “reason-
ably foreseeable” that “the permittee would allow 
someone else to drive the car.”).  Many have acknowl-
edged that the likelihood of unlisted drivers using 
rental cars is “exceedingly great,” calling the practice 
“foreseeable,” Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp. v. 
Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp. Co., 319 N.E.2d 182, 184 (N.Y. 
1974), and a “common scenario,” Thrifty Car Rental, 
Inc. v. Crowley, 677 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (Sup. Ct. Al-
bany Cty. 1998); see also Chandler v. Geico Indem. 
Co., 78 So. 3d 1293, 1299 (Fla. 2011) (“a bailee or les-
see of a rented automobile, similarly as its owner, may 
permit another to operate it (and often does).” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Cutler, 159 
P.3d 909, 912 (Idaho Ct. App. 2007) (noting “the in-
creasingly common utilization of rental vehicles for a 
myriad of purposes”).  Use of a rental car by an un-
listed driver is “in the very nature of modern automo-
bile use.”  Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3, 
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6–7 (Fla. 1972).  Kennedy thus got it exactly back-
wards when it characterized sharing of rental cars as 
a sinister, “deceptive” act rather than what it really 
is: “a largely harmless and even expected occurrence 
that can be easily managed by the owner.”  638 F.3d 
at 167 (seeking to draw contrast with renters who re-
turn their vehicles late). 
The fine print of a private contract of adhesion 
“cannot control the paramount constitutional ques-
tion” whether a person has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 
(10th Cir. 1986).  Although they can certainly be a rel-
evant factor, a defendant’s formal legal rights in rela-
tion to a given location are rarely dispositive of 
whether he reasonably expects that place to be open 
for “public inspection.”  California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35, 41 (1988); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 690 (11th Cir. 1999) (“lack of 
ownership is not dispositive”).  The Third Circuit’s ap-
proach conflicts with this Court’s Fourth Amendment 
precedent and cannot be sustained. 
B. Unlisted Drivers Can Have Cognizable 
Property Interests in Rental Cars.  
The Court has warned that Fourth Amendment 
protections should not hinge on “arcane distinctions 
developed in property” law, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 
but the Third Circuit’s test is even worse:  It hinges on 
a misunderstanding of property law.  Under the com-
mon and statutory law of many jurisdictions, it is 
simply untrue that “an unauthorized driver has no 
cognizable property interest in the rental vehicle.”  
Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165.  To the contrary, in a num-
ber of States a person who drives a rental car with the 
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renter’s permission has legal rights and duties that 
arise from that temporary control of the car.  See, e.g., 
Hall v. State, 477 S.E.2d 364, 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) 
(unlisted rental-car driver’s “use of the car created a 
bailment”).  When it comes to the question of who is 
an “authorized” driver, the property law in these 
States does what the Third Circuit’s approach does 
not—it accounts for the substantial difference be-
tween a driver who has the renter’s permission to use 
the car and someone who has no permission at all. 
State law often defines the contours of property in-
terests protected by the Constitution.  See Bd. of Re-
gents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) 
(“Property interests, of course, are not created by the 
Constitution.  Rather they are created … from an in-
dependent source such as state law.”); Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 
80 (1998) (“[S]tate law typically defines the property 
rights given constitutional protection against federal 
officials.”).  Bailment law governs the rights and obli-
gations of persons who receive possession of an item, 
such as a car, from someone who has permission to 
use the item from the owner.  Such persons are re-
ferred to as “permittees,” “sub-permittees,” “bailees,” 
or “sub-bailees.”  
At common law, anyone who acquired possession 
of an item, whether with the ultimate owner’s permis-
sion or not, was required “to be diligent, to keep the 
chattel as his own,” or be liable to the owner.  Samuel 
Stoljar, The Early History of Bailment, 1 Am. J. Legal 
Hist. 5, 22 (1957).  Further, anyone who acquired such 
liability also had the corresponding right to exclude 
others and, for a limited period, obtained sole custody 
and control of the item.  Albert S. Thayer, Possession, 
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18 Harv. L. Rev. 196, 206 (1905) (“If a bailee intends 
to exclude strangers to the title, it is enough for pos-
session under the law, although he is perfectly ready 
to give the thing up to its owner at any moment.” (ci-
tation omitted)); see also, e.g., State v. Sanders, 614 
P.2d 998, 1000, 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing 
a sub-permittee’s possessory interest in a car).  Ac-
cordingly, some States hold a sub-bailee, a bailee, and 
the owner all equally liable for negligence.  See, e.g., 
Pabon v. InterAmerican Car Rental, Inc., 715 So. 2d 
1148, 1150 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998). 
With the development of automobiles and rental 
vehicles, States have built an array of doctrines on top 
of this common-law background to regulate sub-bail-
ees.  Several jurisdictions treat undisclosed drivers of 
rental cars as foreseeable contingencies and permit 
additional drivers to retain possessory interests in 
rental cars while they are driving them.  In New York, 
for example, rental-car agencies are considered to 
have “constructively” consented to additional drivers 
for certain purposes despite contractual provisions re-
stricting use of the vehicle to the renter and his imme-
diate family.  Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 
319 N.E.2d at 184.  These jurisdictions reason that 
rental-car companies “kn[o]w or certainly should … 
know[] that the probabilities [of] vehicles coming into 
the hands of another person are entirely too great” to 
treat an unlisted driver as a legal nonentity.  Ibid.; cf. 
United States v. Little, 945 F. Supp. 79, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (agreeing “that if the driver of a rental car has 
the permission of the lessee to drive the vehicle, then 
he has a legitimate possessory interest”).  Similarly, 
in California, “specific admonition[s] not to permit an-
yone else to drive” are inapplicable where “the owner 
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has committed the general use of the car to the per-
mittee,” as in the case of rentals.  8 Cal. Jur. 3d Auto-
mobiles § 529 (“The owner of a motor vehicle is re-
sponsible for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions 
by a subpermittee even though the subpermittee op-
erated the owner’s vehicle with authorization only 
from the permittee … .”).  Florida law is similar.  See, 
e.g., Chandler, 78 So. 3d at 1297 (rental-car companies 
“in actuality intrust[] th[e] automobile to the renter 
for all ordinary purposes for which an automobile is 
rented,” and unauthorized drivers do not change this 
relationship regardless of “[t]he restrictions agreed 
upon”); see also Campbell, 59 N.E.3d at 400 (“author-
ization to use a rental vehicle may be provided by 
renters as well as by the rental company in at least 
some circumstances”). 
These States’ recognition of unlisted drivers’ pos-
sessory interests coheres with the property-law anal-
ysis in other contexts.  In a recent Fourth Amendment 
case, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the or-
ganizers of an event at a warehouse had a cognizable 
possessory interest (and thus a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy) in the warehouse because they re-
ceived the permission of the sublessee to use the facil-
ity.  Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1189 
(2015). 
The Third Circuit’s blithe assertion that “an unau-
thorized driver has no cognizable property interest in 
the rental vehicle,” Kennedy, 638 F.3d at 165, ignores 
the property-law principles governing sub-bailments 
and similar arrangements.  So even if formal property 
rights were dispositive of a person’s reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, the court of appeals’ approach is on 
unsteady ground. 
20 
 
C. The Rental-Contract Terms Forming the 
Basis for the Third Circuit’s Ruling Have 
Been Rejected as Unenforceable. 
Courts that do not recognize the reasonableness of 
an unlisted rental-car driver’s expectation of privacy 
base their conclusion largely on the rental contract’s 
prohibition of unlisted drivers.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Roper, 918 F.2d 885, 886 (10th Cir. 1990) (no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy for an unlisted driver 
because “[t]he rental contract provided that the car 
could only be driven by the lessee”).  But courts con-
sistently refuse to enforce those clauses in the very 
context in which they are intended to apply—insur-
ance coverage. 
Rental-car companies rely on unlisted-driver pro-
hibitions “as a basis for negating omnibus [insurance] 
coverage which otherwise would have been available 
to the lessee or his forbidden permittees.”  Irvin E. 
Schermer & William J. Schermer, 1 Automobile Lia-
bility Insurance § 6:18 (4th ed. 2008).  But “a substan-
tial number of courts” have “refused to permit a viola-
tion of the prohibition” to negate that insurance cov-
erage.  Ibid.; see also Boudreaux v. ABC Ins. Co., 689 
F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1982) (unlisted driver “was 
covered” by the contract’s insurance clause because 
“he had permission from the named” driver “to drive 
the automobile,” despite the rental contract’s prohibi-
tion of unlisted drivers); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Travelers 
Ins. Co., 350 N.E.2d 616, 617 (N.Y. 1976) (per curiam) 
(“recogniz[ing]” the “realities and exigencies of com-
mercial automobile rentals”); “Permissive” Use of Au-
tomobile—Delegation of Permission to Second Permit-
tee, 17 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 409, § 11 (1992) 
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(“courts in many jurisdictions tend to ignore express 
prohibitions against delegation”). 
Legal doctrines like “implied consent,” “lawful pos-
session,” and “initial permission” “defang” the con-
tractual prohibition on unlisted drivers in the insur-
ance-coverage context.  Schermer & Schermer, supra, 
§ 6:18 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
courts have held that a “person may be in lawful pos-
session of an automobile if he is given possession by 
someone using the automobile with the express per-
mission of the owner, even though” the rental contract 
prohibits unlisted drivers.  Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Aetna 
Life & Cas. Co., 362 S.E.2d 836, 840 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1987).  And when a renter gives permission to an un-
listed driver to operate the rental car, “subsequent use 
short of actual conversion or theft” is “permissive.”  
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Budget Rent-A-Car 
Sys., Inc., 359 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
Courts have reasoned that prohibiting unlisted 
drivers from operating rental cars with the renter’s 
permission would nullify an essential “purpose” of the 
rental car for which the renter had bargained.  BATS, 
Inc. v. Shikuma, 617 P.2d 575, 577 (Haw. Ct. App. 
1980) (per curiam) (insured was still “using” the 
rental vehicle even when an unlisted driver was re-
turning it, despite the rental contract’s unlisted-
driver prohibition).  “Rental of an automobile is for a 
broad, almost unfettered, use,” including having un-
listed drivers operate the vehicle.  State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 883 S.W.2d 530, 
533 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). 
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Some courts have concluded that rental-car com-
panies must anticipate that unlisted drivers will op-
erate their rental cars, and so must not actually in-
tend to enforce the prohibition.  It is “foreseeable and 
inevitable” that some rental vehicles “will be operated 
in violation of a restrictive lease agreement.”  Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 49 A.D.2d 613, 614 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1975), modified, 350 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 1976).  
Rental-car companies do “not have a reasonable basis 
for believing that” driver restrictions will “be carried 
out,” and therefore are “deemed to have given implied 
permission to the use of the subject automobile with-
out the said restriction.”  Fin. Indem. Co. v. Hertz 
Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 249, 254 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) 
(affirming district court’s findings). 
This widespread rejection of unlisted-driver re-
strictions in rental-car contracts further undermines 
the Third Circuit’s already wobbly rule.  Courts often 
refuse to enforce such provisions, largely on the basis 
that rental companies are well aware that renters rou-
tinely allow unlisted persons to drive the rental vehi-
cle.  There can be no basis for inferring that those 
same, largely null contract clauses deprive unlisted 
drivers of their constitutionally protected expectation 
of privacy. 
* * * 
As this Court made clear in Rakas, Fourth 
Amendment protections do not depend on “arcane dis-
tinctions developed in property” law.  439 U.S. at 143.  
And this makes good sense:  Courts take a variety of 
often conflicting approaches in the context of rental 
vehicles.  Americans’ reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy do not hinge on which property test a given court 
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might use.  Instead, social conceptions of reasonable-
ness can establish an expectation of privacy protected 
by the Constitution.  Here, the Third Circuit—follow-
ing the lead of several other courts—erred in holding 
that neither strand of this Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence permitted petitioner to challenge the 
search at issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court’s review is warranted to clarify the 
Fourth Amendment rights of unlisted rental-car  
drivers. 
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